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Syria THE ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY
Syria's maintenance of a substantial military establishment
has affected the nation's political, social, and economic
development, but the military's greatest impact has been on
Syrian society's political orientation. Except during the first
three years of independence, the head of government has been a
military officer. From March 1949 to November 1970, power
struggles among the factions of the highly politicized officer
corps led to fifteen changes of government by military coups and
undermined the organizational structure and military capability
of the armed forces
(see After Independence
, ch. 1). Conversely,
the relative political stability since Assad assumed power in
early 1971 and the regime's emphasis on building up the military
have contributed to increased professionalization of the armed
forces. However, the absence of coups d'état between 1971 and
1987 did not indicate the military's decline as a political
force. In fact, the armed forces remained the mainstay of Assad's
regime. His success in maintaining their loyalty was largely the
result of his ability to mobilize popular support for his
leadership, the creation of a powerful and pervasive domestic
intelligence and security apparatus, and, until its 1984
reconstitution as an armed division, the formation of the Defense
Companies. The other pillar of Assad's power, the Baath Party,
has close associations with the armed forces through the party's
military branch. Thus the army and the party have direct
institutional linkages
(see Baath Party Apparatus
, ch. 4).
Despite the effectiveness of the military-political
interrelationship, occasional evidence of political dissent
within the officer corps existed. These problems stemmed from
long-standing tensions between the Sunni Muslim majority and the
minority Alawis who held most senior posts. In July 1977 the
Manchester Guardian Weekly reported that Syrian officials
had uncovered within the armed forces clandestine organizations
believed to have participated in the assassination of a number of
senior Alawi officers. Such activity, if it indeed existed, has
important political implications for the future of the Assad
regime. For example, a power struggle among factions centering
around personalities among Alawi officers is an ever-present
danger. Whatever may happen, it seemed clear that the armed
forces, because of their capability for violent coercion, would
continue to be the ultimate arbiters of political power in Syria.
The most significant sociological impact of the armed forces
has been the social mobility that the officer corps has provided
the nation's lower classes. Syria's upper classes have
consistently disdained attending military academies, considering
them to offer inferior education and a military career to lack
prestige. Hence, the majority of cadets and officers are of
peasant and village origin; a military career has afforded them
rapid social mobility to positions of political power and
influence. In 1975 one observer stated that in the view of many
younger officers the importance of the military lay as much in
its role as an instrument for social change as in its military
role against Israel.
In particular, the armed forces have been the best vehicle
for social mobility for Syria's Alawi community. Although they
comprise about 11 percent of the population and are traditionally
the poorest of Syria's ethnic minorities, hundreds of Alawis have
risen from an impoverished childhood in the rural areas
surrounding Latakia to the pinnacles of power as military
officers.
While furthering social mobility, the armed forces have had a
largely negative effect on economic development. For instance,
the fledgling defense industry has not had much positive impact,
either as an economic resource or as a source of armaments. Also,
the military's requirement for increasing numbers of skilled
technicians and mechanics to maintain and operate a growing
inventory of modern weapons constitutes a drain on the already
limited pool of skilled workers; the technical training some
conscripts receive and use on their return to civilian life has
not offset the drain. The rapid growth of the armed forces from
about 80,000 in 1967 to 500,000 in 1986 inevitably slowed
economic growth because of the loss of manpower in all sectors of
the economy
(see Labor Force
, ch. 3).
By all standard indicators, the economic burden of defense
was large. Although government defense expenditures declined
during the five years after the June 1967 War, they jumped
markedly in 1973, beginning a rapid ascent that continued in 1985
and 1986
(see table 14,
Budget Defense Expenditures, 1981-85, Appendix). From 1983 to
1985, defense expenditures reportedly
grew from US$2.6 billion to US$3.3 billion, and in 1986 the
defense budget was estimated at US$3.6 billion. According to the
Syrian government's 1986 Statistical Abstract, estimated
national security expenditures were US$3.7 billion. Between 1985
and 1986, defense expenditures were inflated by the high cost of
maintaining nearly 25,000 troops in Lebanon. In 1985, for
example, defense expenditures consumed about 30 percent of all
central government expenditures
(see Budget, ch. 3).
In 1986
there were reports that defense would account for over 55 percent
of total government expenditures in Syria's 1987 budget, and that
government spending on defense was driving Syria into heavy debt
and an acute economic crisis.
Syria has consistently ranked among the countries with the
highest burdens of defense on society. Economic and military
analysts contended that the Syrian government's growing defense
expenditures have severely limited expenditures in other areas
vital to the nation's social and economic progress. According to
data compiled by Ruth Leger Sivard in World Military and
Social Expenditures, for example, in 1983 military
expenditures per capita were the equivalent of US$249 (ranked
27th in the world), while public expenditures for education were
US$102 (ranked 52nd); for health they were US$7 (ranked 95th).
In spite of these figures, observers agreed that the
government's officially reported defense expenditures markedly
understated the actual resources devoted to national defense. The
same observers also suspected that the reported expenditures did
not include such important items as construction projects for
military use.
Data as of April 1987
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