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Syria Foreign Influences in the Development of the Armed Forces
Various foreign countries were essential to the development
of the armed forces of the late 1980s. As the former colonial
power, France had been the dominant foreign influence during the
formative years after Syria's independence. Later, Britain and
the United States also aided the military, largely by serving as
sources of professional officer training. During the 1958-61
union with Egypt, Egyptian doctrine and training were
influential. By 1987, however, the Soviet Union was the
predominant foreign influence, as it had been for over two
decades. At times, Syrian-Soviet relations have been strained,
and Syria has guarded its freedom to make policy independent of
the Soviets, particularly with regard to Iraq, Lebanon, and the
Palestinians. However, Soviet military assistance and the
presence of Soviet military advisers continued to be essential to
the growth and professionalization of the armed forces. Other
East European countries, notably Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
and Romania, have also provided some materiel and training
(see Foreign Policy
, ch. 4).
The Soviet-Syrian military relationship began in March 1955,
when the Soviets offered to extend considerable economic and
military assistance in support of Syria's refusal to join the
Baghdad Pact, an alliance that was being formed under the general
auspices of Britain and the United States. Initial arms shipments
arrived from Czechoslovakia in 1956, but East European aid was
small-scale until the rise of Baathist President Nureddin Atassi
in 1966. During the June 1967 War, the threat of Soviet
intervention on behalf of Syria and Egypt was partly responsible
for halting the Israeli advance on both fronts. After the June
1967 War, Soviet military aid to Syria grew substantially and the
Soviets established a sizable military presence there.
Assad's rise to power led to a strengthening of political and
military ties with the Soviet Union. Contributing to these closer
relations was Egypt's sudden ouster of Soviet military advisers
in July 1972, which caused an increased Soviet interest in Syria.
The months preceding the October 1973 War saw a significant
increase in Soviet arms flow to Syria. During the war, Soviet
military advisers supervised the operations at SAM sites and were
present at Syrian command posts.
The most significant Soviet involvement between October 10-
23, 1973, however, was its airlift of almost 4,000 tons of
military equipment and its sealift of considerably more, to rearm
the Syrian and Egyptian armies. Within a year after the ceasefire , the Soviets had more than replaced Syria's massive
equipment loss.
However, Syria's intervention in the Lebanese Civil War
against leftist Muslim forces in 1976 led to a strain in SovietSyrian relations. For more than a year, the Soviets suspended
deliveries of military materiel, while Syria retaliated by
reducing its Soviet military presence and halting training for
its military in the Soviet Union. To replace Soviet support,
Saudi Arabia supplied most of the funds to maintain Syria's
troops in Lebanon. By 1987, however, Saudi financial aid was
believed to have decreased.
During the Syrian-Soviet rapprochement in 1978, Libya
reportedly supplied the equivalent of US$500 million to US$1
billion to pay for Syria's Soviet-supplied weaponry, including 12
MiG-27s.
Syria was also able to pay for Soviet weaponry as a result of
the October 1978 Arab summit in Baghdad that pledged payments to
Syria (as well as to Jordan and the PLO) if it agreed to reject
the Camp David accords (signed in Washington in September 1978).
Under the agreement, Syria was allotted US$1.8 billion annually.
Only a few countries, however, notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
maintained regular payments; consequently, Syria has received
only US$700 to $800 million per year in Baghdad Agreement aid
(see Balance of Payments
, ch. 3).
From 1979 to 1983, the Soviet Union delivered US$9.2 billion
in arms transfers (out of a total of US$10.53 billion pledged).
Czechoslovakia was the next largest supplier, with US$470 million
in military aid. China delivered US$90 million, Poland US$30
million, and Romania US$20 million. In addition, Syria received
US$200 million in military aid from France, US$180 million from
Britain, and US$40 million from West Germany.
In addition to arms, Syria received military advisers and
technicians from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and sent
military personnel to those countries for training. The number of
such advisers and technicians in Syria was estimated at 3,500 in
the aftermath of the 1973 War, 2,500 in 1976, 2,000 to 3,000 in
1978, 5,300 in 1984, and 2,300 in 1986. With regard to training,
the United States Central Intelligence Agency has estimated that
6,600 Syrian military personnel trained in the Soviet Union
between 1955 and 1985 and a further 1,515 trained in other East
European countries.
Some observers saw the 1980 Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation between Syria and the Soviet Union as the culmination
of the two countries' relationship. From the Syrian perspective,
however, this treaty had a deep-seated flaw; there was no
reference in it to Syria's position in Lebanon. Syria wanted and
had requested a "strategic agreement" with the Soviet Union to
offset any United States-Israeli agreement. Yet no such SovietSyrian agreement was signed and no broader alliance evolved,
although the Soviet Union increased its military assistance
following Syria's 1982 defeat in Lebanon. While maintaining its
sovereignty, Syria expressed appreciation for Soviet assistance
by granting the Soviets facilities to base reconnaissance
aircraft and expanding the ports of Latakia and Tartus to
accommodate large Soviet ships.
In 1983 and 1984, the Soviet Union increased involvement by
installing SAM-5, SAM-6, SAM-9, and SS-21 missile systems in
Syria. These SAM systems, which had adequate range to cover a
major part of the region, were at first manned and protected by
Soviet advisers and troops and have only gradually been turned
over to Syrian control. The large Soviet resupply of SAM systems
was interpreted by the United States, Israel, and Jordan as a
Soviet response to the massive destruction of Soviet-built SAMs
in the Lebanese War, among other reasons. Syria acquired
additional T-72 tanks following Assad's October 1984 visit to
Moscow.
In 1983 Syria's rejection of the Camp David accords, its
alleged support for international terrorism, and its close
friendship with the Soviet Union led the United States Congress
to prohibit any new aid; since 1979, no new American aid has been
assigned to Syria. Meanwhile, despite, or perhaps because of, the
dominant Soviet influence on the armed forces, Assad has
repeatedly sought to diversify Syria's source of armaments, for
instance, by negotiations with France. However, Syrian-French
arms deals broke down over the issue of Syrian support for antiFrench terrorist groups. In general, Syrian efforts to purchase
Western defense technology have been unsuccessful.
Data as of April 1987
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