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Syria Syrian-United States Relations
Over the years, United States-Syrian bilateral relations
ranged between grudging mutual accommodation and outright mutual
hostility. But even when the relationship was strained severely,
the fundamental United States policy toward Syria with regard to
the broader Arab-Israeli conflict has remained consistent. The
United States endorses United Nations Security Council Resolution
242, the implementation of which would entail the return of the
Israeli-annexed Golan Heights to Syrian control.
For its part, Syria has often vehemently criticized American
policy in the Middle East. At the same time, however, it has
recognized that Resolution 242 contains provisions in its favor.
Syria has been willing to negotiate with the United States over
the Arab-Israeli conflict and other regional issues, as long as
the diplomacy is conducted quietly and behind the scenes. Syria
has also adhered scrupulously to the commitments and promises it
has made to American negotiators.
Since the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in
the 1950s, the United States has strongly supported Israel but
has simultaneously indicated, particularly after the October 1973
War, that it acknowledges the legitimacy of some of Syria's
grievances against Israel. In the aftermath of Israel's attack on
Syrian forces in Lebanon in 1982, the United States was forced to
choose between irreconcilable Israeli and Syrian ambitions in
Lebanon; the administration of Ronald Reagan chose to endorse the
Israeli position. President Reagan supported the May 17, 1983,
Lebanese-Israeli accords and linked this peace treaty to his
attempts to revive the Arab-Israeli peace process. However, Syria
stymied the Reagan initiative, in part by inciting opposition to
American policies among its surrogates and proxies in Lebanon.
The United States also suspected Syria of having played a role in
attacks on the United States Embassy and on the Marine barracks
in Beirut. Although the degree of Syrian complicity was never
determined, American officials believed that Syria at least had
foreknowledge of and acquiesced in the attacks
(see Sponsorship of Terrorism
, ch. 5). Syrian-United States relations reached
their nadir in December 1983, when the two nations engaged in
near warfare. On December 4, United States carrier-based
warplanes attacked Syrian antiaircraft installations in Lebanon's
Biqa Valley (two were shot down), and on December 13 and 14,
United States battleships shelled Syrian positions. From a
military viewpoint, the clashes were not highly significant.
However, they marked the first American-Syrian armed conflict and
reinforced Syria's view of the United States regional policy as
gunboat diplomacy.
In June 1985, Syrian-United States relations improved
dramatically when Syria interceded on behalf of the United States
after the hijacking to Beirut of Trans World Airlines flight 847.
Reagan expressed his appreciation of Syria's role in securing
release of the hostages, albeit in guarded language. Yet to some
observers Syria's ability to impose its will on the hijackers
confirmed Syrian links to terrorism. Although Syria had been
accused repeatedly of supporting Palestinian terrorism against
American, West European, and Israeli targets in the Middle East
and in Western Europe, there had been little evidence, much less
proof, of direct Syrian complicity in terrorist attacks against
Western targets.
However, when a Jordanian, Nizar Hindawi, was apprehended on
April 17, 1986, after attempting to smuggle a bomb aboard an
Israeli El Al Airlines plane in London, he confessed that Syrian
intelligence officers had masterminded the abortive attack and
that Syria had provided him with the training, logistical
support, and explosives to carry out the plot. Britain reportedly
collected evidence that corroborated Hindawi's story. As a
consequence, on May 6, 1986, Vice President George Bush said of
Syria, "We are convinced their fingerprints have been on
international terrorist acts," and on November 14, 1986, the
United States imposed sanctions on Syria "in response to Syria's
continued support for international terrorism." The White House,
however, also stated that "Syria can play an important role in a
key region of the world, but it cannot expect to be accepted as a
responsible power or treated as one as long as it continues to
use terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy."
In these statements, the United States censured Syria for
sponsoring terrorism but also implied recognition of Syria's
potentially central role in the Middle East. Even since Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger's first visit to Damascus in December
1973, Assad has attempted to persuade successive American
administrations of the truth of the old adage "There can be no
war in the Middle East without Egypt, but there can be no peace
in the Middle East without Syria." Assad sought to convince the
United States that Syria, however intransigent its negotiating
stance, should not be ignored in any comprehensive Middle East
peace treaty because it could resume war with Israel and
therefore exert veto power over an Arab-Israeli settlement. At
the same time, however, Assad was convinced that the United
States was indispensable in any Middle East peace because only
the United States could force Israel to make concessions to the
Arabs.
Data as of April 1987
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