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Kazakstan
Nazarbayev and Political Prospects
Public opinion in Kazakstan appears to have accepted the imposition
of presidential rule, at least partly because the parliament Nazarbayev
dissolved had focused on its own wages and benefits rather than
on solving the nation's problems. In the short run, the imposition
of direct presidential rule seemed likely to reduce ethnic tensions
within the republic. Indeed, one of Nazarbayev's primary justifications
for assuming greater power was the possibility that bolstered
presidential authority could stem the growing ethnic hostility
in the republic, including a general rise in anti-Semitism.
The ethnic constituency whose appeasement is most important
is, however, the Russians, both within the republic and in Russia
proper. Stability in Kazakstan is overwhelmingly shaped by developments
in Russia, especially as that country returns its attention to
some measure of reintegration of the former Soviet empire. Because
of Kazakstan's great vulnerability to Russian political, economic,
and military intervention, experts assume that Russian national
and ethnic interests play a considerable part in Nazarbayev's
political calculations (see Foreign Policy; National Security
Prospects, this ch.).
It also seems likely that Nazarbayev would use presidential
rule to increase the linguistic and cultural rights of the republic's
Russians. Although Nazarbayev had taken a firm stand on the issue
of formal dual citizenship, a treaty he and Russia's president,
Boris N. Yeltsin, signed in January 1995 all but obviated the
language question by permitting citizens of the respective countries
to own property in either republic, to move freely between them,
to sign contracts (including contracts for military service) in
either country, and to exchange one country's citizenship for
the other's. When the Kazak parliament ratified that agreement,
that body also voted to extend to the end of 1995 the deadline
by which residents must declare either Kazakstani or Russian citizenship.
After the dissolution of that parliament, Kazakstan considered
extending the deadline until 2000, as Russia already had done.
In the mid-1990s, Nazarbayev seemed likely to face eventual
opposition from Kazak nationalists if he continued making concessions
to the republic's Russians. Such opposition would be conditioned,
however, by the deep divisions of ethnic Kazaks along clan and
family lines, which give some of them more interests in common
with the Russians than with their ethnic fellows. The Kazaks also
have no institutions that might serve as alternative focuses of
political will. Despite a wave of mosque building since independence,
Islam is not well established in much of the republic, and there
is no national religious-political network through which disaffected
Kazaks might be mobilized.
The lack of an obvious venue for expression of popular dissatisfaction
does not mean, however, that none will materialize. Nazarbayev
gambled that imposition of presidential rule would permit him
to transform the republic's economy and thus placate the opposition
through an indisputable and widespread improvement of living standards.
Experts agree that the republic has the natural resources and
industrial potential to make this a credible wager. But a number
of conditions outside Nazarbayev's control, such as the political
climate in Russia and the other Central Asian states, would influence
that outcome. By dismissing parliament and taking upon himself
the entire burden of government, Nazarbayev made himself the obvious
target for the public discontent that radical transformations
inevitably produce.
Data as of March 1996
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