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Angola External Support
![[JPEG]](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jpeg.gif)
Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola
Courtesy Free Angola Information Service
UNITA troops atop a Soviet-built BTR-60 captured in Mavinga
in 1987
Courtesy Free Angola Information Service
FALA, like FAPLA, would not have been able to expand
its size,
capabilities, and range of operations without extensive
external
assistance. By supplying UNITA with US$80 million worth of
assistance annually during the 1980s, Pretoria remained
the group's
principal source of arms, training, logistical, and
intelligence
support. The SAAF made regular air drops of weapons,
ammunition,
medicine, food, and equipment, sometimes at night to avoid
interception, and was reported occasionally to have
ferried FALA
troops. South African instructors provided training in
both Namibia
and UNITA-controlled areas of southern Angola. The largest
training
center in Namibia was at Rundu, where intensive
three-month
training courses were conducted. In late 1988, amidst
regional
peace negotiations, there were reports that UNITA was
planning to
relocate its main external logistical supply lines from
South
Africa to Zaire and was moving its headquarters and forces
into
Namibia's Caprivi Strip before the anticipated arrival of
a UN
peacekeeping force.
In addition to aid from South Africa, UNITA received
support in
varying degrees from numerous black African and North
African
states. Zaire provided sanctuary and allowed its territory
to be
used by others to train and resupply UNITA forces, and
Zambia and
Malawi were suspected of granting clandestine overflight
and
landing privileges. During the 1970s, UNITA troops were
trained in
Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and other African countries.
Subsequently, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, Somalia, and
Tunisia also
furnished financial and military aid. Morocco, which had
supplied
arms to the MPLA during the liberation struggle, switched
sides and
became a major source of military training for FALA,
especially for
officers, paratroops, and artillery personnel. Saudi
Arabia,
Kuwait, and other Arab states furnished financial support
valued at
US$60 million to US$70 million annually. Israel was also
reported
to have provided military aid and training to UNITA
soldiers at
Kamina in Zaire. Although Savimbi denied that UNITA had
ever
employed foreign mercenaries or advisers, there had been
reports of
South African, French, Israeli, and Portuguese combatants
among his
forces.
Beginning in 1986, the United States had supplied UNITA
with
US$15 million to US$20 million annually in "covert"
military aid
funded out of the budget of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).
The first acknowledged shipments of United States aid
consisted of
nonlethal items such as trucks, medical equipment, and
uniforms,
but antitank and air defense weapons soon followed. The
bulk of
this matériel was reportedly airlifted through Kamina
airbase in
Zaire's Shaba Province, where a UNITA liaison detachment
was
stationed and CIA operatives were believed by Luanda to
have
trained 3,000 UNITA guerrillas. The remainder was thought
to have
been delivered through South Africa, Gabon, and Central
African
Republic.
Data as of February 1989
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![[JPEG]](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/angola/ao05_05b.jpg)
![[JPEG]](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/angola/ao05_05c.jpg)
